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Ohio Personal Property Tax
Kenneth G. Humer
HE SUBJECT OF personal property taxation contains three
major areas of interest for the tax attorney: (1) the method of
computation of the personal property tax; (2) the procedure avail-
able to the taxpayer for claiming a reduction in his tax basis; and
(3) the advantages obtainable
through the so-called federalTHE AUTHOR (B.B.A., Western Reserve election. It is the purpose of this
University, LL.B., Cleveland-Marshall
law School) is a Certified Public Ac- article to analyze these areas of
countant and practicing attorney in Ak-
ron, Ohio. concern and to give special em-
phasis to the important recent
developments in each area.
I. COMPUTATION OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX
A. Rate of Taxation
All personal property located and used in business in Ohio is
subject to taxation.1 Generally, tangible personal property is listed
and assessed at seventy per cent of its "true value in money," while
personal property used in business is listed and assessed at fifty per
cent of its "true value in money."2
Personal property is "used" within the meaning of "used in busi-
ness" when (1) it is employed or utilized in connection with ordi-
nary or special operations; (2) it is acquired or held as a means or
instrument for carrying on the business; (3) it is kept and main-
tained as a part of a plant capable of operation; or (4) it is stored
or kept on hand as material, parts, products, or merchandise3
B. Tax Basis
Generally, the basis used for the taxation of property in Ohio
has been the property's true value in money. The true value of
personal property has usually been equated to the full cash value
of the property. In addition to the problems surrounding the com-
1 OHIo REv. CODE § 5709.01.
2 OHIO REV. CODE 5 5711.22.'
3 Oto REV. CODE § 5701.08 (A).
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putation of the full cash value of a chattel or intangible, recent at-
tacks on this mode of computation have raised questions even as to
its constitutionality.
(1) True Value in Money.-Historically, tangible personal
property has been assessed for tax purposes at fixed percentages of
full cash value, whereas land and improvements thereon have been
taxed by uniform rule according to value.4 Prior to 1965, the Ohio
Revised Code provided that the "auditor shall assess all the real es-
tate situated in the county at its true value in money."5 In applying
this statutory provision, it has become customary for auditors to
assess real property at approximately forty per cent of its alleged
true value in money.
Since the Ohio Constitution confined the traditional uniformity
rule to real estate, it impliedly permitted classification of personal
property. As a result, provisions were made for assessing various
classes of tangible personal property at fixed percentages of true
value in money of either fifty or seventy per cent.' Until recently,
no truly direct attack had been made upon this method of valuation.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently rendered a decision
in a case which challenged the present method of assessing personal
property.
7
In Continental Can Co. v. Schneider,8 the appellant company
included with its 1963 return a claim for deduction from book value.
By this claim it sought, for purposes of taxation, to have its taxable
tangible personal property valued at forty per cent of its net de-
preciated book value. This percentage was the approximate state-
wide average ratio between assessed valuations for real property tax
purposes and market values, as determined by the Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals in sales ratio studies conducted by it. To the value thus
determined, Continental then applied either the fifty per cent or
seventy per cent rate, with the result that certain property was listed
for taxation at twenty to twenty-eight per cent of true value.
Continental's claim was disallowed, and the property was assessed
4 OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2.
5 OHIO REV. CODE § 5713.01. In November, 1965, this section was amended twice.
It now reads, in part: "The auditor shall assess all the real estate situated in the county
at its taxable value in accordance with sections 5713.03 and 5715.01. OHIO REV.
CODE § 5713.01 (Supp. 1965).
6 OHIO REv. CODE § 5711.22.
Continental Can Co. v. Schneider, 3 CCH STATE TAx REP. Ohio 5 200-603
(B.T.A. 1965), aff'd sub nom., Continental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. 2d 224,




at fifty to seventy per cent of its true value in money. The company
filed an application for review and redetermination, in which it
made four major contentions. It urged, first, that the owners of
real and personal property had been placed by the legislature in
the same statutory class for purposes of taxation, since "true value
in money" was the criterion employed to describe the basic measure
of assessment for both types of property. It therefore concluded,
second, that the company should have been assessed at the same per-
centage of "true value in money" as the owners of real property.
Third, it alleged that the systematic practice by tax authorities
of using different percentages of full "true value in money" in ar-
riving at assessable valuations for purposes of real and personal
property taxation was discriminatory and unconstitutional. Finally,
the company emphasized that the Tax Commissioner has the statu-
tory power and duty to assess the applicant's personal property at
the same percentage of true value, i.e., forty per cent, as prevails in
the assessment of real property.
Thus, the essential issue raised in the Continental Can Co. case
was whether the term "true value in money" should have the same
meaning when it is applied to the valuation of tangible personal
property for taxation purposes as it has when applied to real
property.
At the hearing on Continental's application for review and rede-
termination, the Tax Commissioner found that, as an administrative
official, he was forced to presume the validity and constitutionality
of statutory enactments and was without authority to judge that is-
sue.9 The company then perfected its appeal to the Ohio Board
of Tax Appeals. The Board found that "tangible personal prop-
erty" had been classified separately from real property by the leg-
islature and that this classification was both reasonable and con-
stitutional. It further pointed out that there is no constitutional re-
quirement that real property be valued at its "true value in money,"
since this requirement is purely statutory."0 Without deciding the
question of whether the uniformity rule is equally applicable to per-
sonal and real property, the Board held that the terminology "true
value in money is a constitutional term and that the failure of the
statute to further define the term does not render the statute so vague
9 He relied on S. S. Kresge v. Bowers, 170 Ohio St. 405, 166 NE.2d.139 (1960);
Risk & Co. v. Bowers, 114 Ohio App. 429, 183 N.E.2d 786 (1961); McCreary v.
Bowers, 106 Ohio App. 445, 155 N.E.2d 224 (1958).
10 Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals, 169 Ohio St. 445, 160 N.E.2d 275 (1959).
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or indefinite as to be meaningless."" The Board, in effect, found
that Continental had not shown that its property had been valued
at more than its "true value in money." Thus, it sustained the Tax
Commissioner and ignored the real issue. The Ohio Supreme Court,
in affirming the decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, held
that there was no violation of either the United States or the Ohio
Constitutions.' 2
(2) Calculation of Full Cash Value.--"True value in money"
in the case of machinery and equipment is ordinarily the taxpayer's
depreciated book value. However, in many instances the Depart-
ment of Taxation requires the taxpayer to use its own schedule of
depreciation rates for valuation purposes. This schedule, known as
a "302 Computation Directive," states that "in valuing equipment
used in business, the Department of Taxation will adhere to the fol-
lowing composite depreciation rates. Such rates are prima facie only
and are subject to adjustment in all cases where special or unusual
circumstances or conditions of use are shown to exist.'1
3
As a practical matter, even though these composite rates are
prima facie only, the present policy of the Department of Taxation
is to make their use mandatory by the examining agent. Thus, the
taxpayer who uses rates for book purposes different from the "302
rates" can only obtain relief from strict observance of "302 rates"
through a hearing before the Tax Commissioner or a court.
Since depreciation rates are predicated upon a taxpayer's expe-
rience, it is submitted that the requirement that an examining agent
strictly adhere to the "302 rates" is not only arbitrary but has the
effect of requiring the taxpayer to go through unnecessary proce-
dural expense and delay in order to bring about those special circum-
" Continental Can Co. v. Schneider, 3 CCH STATE TAX REP. Ohio 5 200-603
(B.T.A. 1965), aff'd sub nom., Continental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. 2d 224,
215 N.E.2d 400 (1966).
125 Ohio St. 2d 224, 215 N.E.2d 400 (1966). The court stated in syllabus 3:
The fact that tangible personal property is valued for tax purposes at full
1true value in money," pursuant to Section 5711.22, Revised Code, whereas
real property in the state is customarily assessed at a percentage of the statu-
torily required (true value in money) valuation as provided for by Section
5713.01, Revised Code, cannot be made the basis for a valid claim for a tax
reduction by the owner of tangible personal property upon the ground that
this constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or Section 2 of Article I or Section 2 of Article XII of the Ohio
Constitution. Id. at 225, 215 N.E.2d at 401.
13 Directive of Dep't of Taxation (July 1, 1965). A subcommittee of the taxation
committee of the Ohio Bar has been appointed for the purpose of studying deprecia-
tion as it relates to personal property taxes, in the hope of achieving a more realistic
approach to this problem.
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stances that would result in a change in rate. In a judgment area
such as this administrative rules should not be inflexible, and exam-
ining agents should be able to exercise independent judgment.
Although equipment is to be assessed at "true value in money,"
it cannot be depreciated below twenty per cent of original cost as
long as the property is held for use in business.' Where the "302"
computation is being used and the taxpayer disposes of equipment
used in business, the cost basis of acquisitions for the respective years
is reduced. However, those taxpayers who do not account for dis-
posals on an individual asset basis by eliminating the value of the
unit sold from cost, but rather credit the sales proceeds to their re-
serve for depreciation account, will find themselves paying personal
property taxes on equipment no longer in use. This result, while
certainly not contemplated by the law, appears to be unavoidable,
since the Board of Tax Appeals has held that the taxpayer's book-
keeping methods must conform to the regulations imposed by the
Tax Commissioner if the taxpayer wishes to secure the tax advan-
tages which the law allows.'5
In 1963, Ohio Revised Code section 5711.22(B) was amended
to provide for the listing and assessment of personal property of
merchants which is sold or held for sale for the use and consumption
of purchasers, which is not for resale, and which must be returned
on an average basis. 8  Two tax categories were established - a
lower one to include up to the first 100,000 dollars in value of the
personal property, and a higher one to include all such property ex-
ceeding 100,000 dollars assessed at "true value in money." Certain
percentages of true value in money were listed and assessed for each
category.1
7
In Kroger Co. v. Schneider,'8 the Kroger Company alleged that
the aforementioned provisions resulted in unequal tax burdens which
were conditioned upon the quantity of inventory owned by specific
taxpayers. The company therefore claimed that these provisions
14 OIO REV. CODE 5 5711.22.
15 Siebler Tailoring Co. v. Peck, 1 CCH STATE TAX REP. Ohio 5 20-326.37 (B.T.A.
1952).
16 Kroger Co. v. Schneider, 205 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio C.P. 1964), rev'd, 4 Ohio App.
2d 226, 212 N.E.2d 76 (1965) (syllabus).
17 As to personal property in the lower category, the following percentages of true
value in money pertain: in 1964, 66%; in 1965, 62%; in 1966, 58%; in 1967, 54%;
and in 1968 and each following year, 50%. As to personal property in the higher
bracket, such property shall be uniformly listed and assessed at 70% of its true value
in money, during the entire period. Ibid.
18 205 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio C.P. 1964), ree'd, 4 Ohio App. 2d 226, 212 N.E.2d 76
(1965).
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violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law.
The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas found that "the Fed-
eral 'due process' and 'equal protection' clauses and the Ohio 'equal
protection of law clause' all forbid a state from levying any taxes di-
rectly on property at graduated or progressive rates,"'" except as ex-
pressly allowed by other portions of the constitutions. As a result,
section 5711.22 (B) was declared void and unenforceable because it:
(a) imposes an unequal burden of taxation on like personal prop-
erty, used for the same purpose, owned by taxpayers similarly
situated, and engaged in the same types of enterprise; (b) it is a
purported classification of taxpayers, not property; and (c) it is
based upon an unreasonable and arbitrary classification not having
any fair or substantial relation to the object of legislation .... 20
On appeal,2 ' the court found that the provisions of section 5711.22 (B)
did not violate the equal protection of the law guarantees of either
the state or federal constitutions, were not unreasonable, capricious,
or discriminatory, and did not impose an unjust burden of the cost
of government upon taxpayers in either bracket or division.22 Thus,
unless this decision is reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court, the
method of listing and returning retail inventories will follow the
statutory provisions of section 5711.22(B) and will be different
from that of manufacturing inventories which are listed upon an
average basis and assessed at fifty per cent of their true value in
money.
23
With respect to inventories, it is important to note that new tax-
payers who engage in business after the beginning of any taxable
year are required to file a return within ninety days therefrom and
to estimate the average value of inventory to be used in the busi-
ness.24 Too often, new taxpayers estimate the value of their inven-
tories ultra-conservatively, with the result that the tax which is paid
is considerably less than the amount that would have been paid had
these figures been more realistically estimated.
In the case of Doraty Rambler, Inc. v. Schneider,25 it was held
that the Tax Commissioner may revise the estimates of taxable in-
ventory values on the basis of actual experience. There the com-
pany had been engaged in the retail sale of used automobiles from
19 Id. at 605.
20 Id. at 607.
21 Kroger Co. v. Schneider, 4 Ohio App. 2d 226, 212 N.E.2d 76 (1965).
2 2 Id. at 227, 212 N.E.2d at 77.
2 3 OHIO RBV. CODE 5711.22(C).
24 OHIo RBv. CODE 5711.03.
2 5 Doraty Rambler, Inc. v. Schneider, 4 Ohio St. 2d 37, 212 N.E.2d 580 (1965).
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1958 until May, 1960, at which time its inventory was liquidated,
and the company moved from its location. In January, 1961, the
company again engaged in the retail automobile business at a new
location. In filing its corporate return of taxable personal property
for 1961, it listed estimated monthly inventory values for that calen-
dar year. Subsequently, it requested a refund based upon the use
of actual inventory figures for the eight months (September, 1959
through April, 1960) of the preceding fiscal year to the time that
operations were suspended. The Tax Commissioner, upon audit of
Doraty's 1961 tax return, made his assessment based upon the actual
inventory figures for the calendar year 1961. The Ohio Supreme
Court found that a taxpayer is not entitled to use his prior year's in-
ventory as his personal property tax basis unless such taxpayer was
a "merchant" engaged in the same line of business on tax listing
day. 6 Accordingly, it affirmed the action of the tax commissioner.
II. CLAIM PROCEDURE
Last year the Ohio legislature modified the procedure for a tax-
payer's claim of a deduction from book value 7 This was probably
a result of the numerous claims for such a deduction.
As in the past, a taxpayer may claim a deduction from book
value by filing a "902 claim" with the return. If the claim is dis-
allowed, the taxpayer may file an application for review and rede-
termination within thirty days from the date on which the notice of
disallowance was mailed.2" Once the Commissioner has made a final
determination, an appeal may be made to the Board of Tax Ap-
peals2 9
Under the revised system, effective as of June 29, 1965, the tax-
payer must pay the disputed tax.a° If it is finally determined that
this tax was not owed, the amount paid will be applied to any future
taxes which may accrue or will be refunded. Thus, if a claim for
deduction from depreciated book value for 1965 and 1966 has been
denied, and an application for review and redetermination filed, the
tax assessment will be made without the allowance.
It should be noted that timely application for review and rede-
termination by the taxpayer is essential. Failure to comply with the
thirty-day time limitation will result in forfeiture of all legal rights
26 Id. at 43, 212 N.E.2d at 584.
27OHIo Rtv. CoDE § 5711.311 (Supp. 1965).
28 OHIo REv. CODE § 5711.31.
2 9 OHIo REv. CODE § 5717.02.
30 OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.311 (Supp. 1965).
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and remedies. The Ohio Department of Taxation has recently is-
sued a notice which contains two samples of statements which may
be submitted with, and inserted in, 1966 personal property tax re-
turns. This should be done at the time of filing and will be ac-
cepted as a claim in writing in lieu of executed form 902."'
III. FEDERAL ELECTION
In listing intangible personal property, taxpayers have the right
to elect to use the federal election form 912.2 This form includes
a summary of the items reported for federal income tax purposes
which are also taxable for Ohio personal property tax purposes. Use
of this form involves certain definite disadvantages. Any taxpayer
who elects to use the federal election form must continue to use that
form for a period of not less than three years in listing his income-
yielding investments. After the three-year period, if the taxpayer
can show good cause, the Tax Commissioner may authorize a change
in the filing method. 3 It should be noted, however, that the De-
partment of Taxation has repeatedly refused to permit the change
where the only reason given was that the taxpayer would save taxes
if permitted to list separately investments yielding income. There-
fore, it appears that the taxpayer will be permitted to change forms
only if the amount of taxes would be approximately the same under
both methods of computation.
Under certain circumstances, the use of the federal election does
have advantages. For example, any security held for investment pur-
poses that has not been outstanding for the entire year is treated as
a non-productive investment, reported at its true value in money, and
taxed at two mills on the dollar.3 4 However, in the case of an in-
dividual taxpayer, if the federal election form is used, the taxpayer
is not required to report the item as unproductive, provided he has
received some income on that investment during the year.35
This advantage will be offset, however, if the taxpayer choosing
to use the federal election form owns shares of stock in a corpora-
tion electing not to be taxed pursuant to the provisions of Subchap-
ter S of the Internal Revenue Code.36 In essence, under these pro-
3' 39 OHIo BAR 497 (April 25, 1966).
3 2 Dept. of Taxation Rule No. 206, 1 CCH STATE TAX REP. Ohio a 21-022.
33 OHIo REv. CODE § 3711.10 (Supp. 1965).
3 4 OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.22 (A).
35 Pickrel v. Bowers, 3 CCH STATE TAx REP. Ohio 5 200-490 (B.T.A. 1963).
86 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
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visions, the entire amount of the income of the corporation is
includable in the federal income tax return of the shareholder on
the basis of his pro rata ownership of the corporation's stock. The
Department of Taxation originally espoused the position that the
total amount of this income, distributed or undistributed, constituted
the income yield on the shares of stock in the Subchapter S corpora-
tion for personal property tax purposes." Subsequently, as a result
of the decision in Michael v. Bowers,3" the Department of Taxation
reversed its position and held that, under the ordinary listing method,
only the amount paid is reported as income yield. However, where
the taxpayer uses the federal election, the entire amount will be
treated as yield for personal property tax purposes.
The federal election will also be disadvantageous to those tax-
payers who receive income from patents and copyrights. If it is util-
ized in that situation, the entire amount of the royalty income must
be reported as opposed to the necessity of reporting only a percen-
tage thereof under normal circumstances. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of recent decisions in most of the areas discussed
in this article makes it imperative that the tax attorney acquaint him-
self with these new developments. Of primary importance is an un-
derstanding of the effect which these decisions will have on Ohio
personal property tax law.4 Cases such as Continental Can Co. v.
Schneider4 and Kroger Co. v. Schneider42 offer a continuing chal-
lenge to the ability of tax attorneys to adjust to the changes in the
area of personal pr6perty taxation.
37 Letter from Ohio Tax Commissioner, Nov. 14, 1958. See also 1 CCH STATE
TAx REP. Ohio 5 20-330.
3 8 Michael v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St 169, 187 N.E.2d 890 (1963).
39 OHio REv. CODE § 5701.10(G).
40 It should be pointed out that claims for refund of federal income tax are
also included within the definition of "other taxable intangibles." Glidden Co. v.
Glander, 151 Ohio St. 344, 86 N.E.2d 1 (1949). In Aeronca Mfg. Corp. v. Schneider,
3 CCH STATE TAx REP. Ohio g 200-659 (1965), the issue presented was whether the
"right" of the taxpayer to make a claim for a federal income tax refund at the close of
the taxable year was includable as "other taxable intangibles." The Ohio Board of
Tax Appeals found that if the manufacturer's refund claim had not been filed with the
federal government on Ohio property tax assessment day, the amount of this claim
must be included as "other taxable intangibles."
413 CCH STATE TAx REP. Ohio 5 200-603 (B.T.A. 1965), affd sub nom., Con-
tinental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. 2d 224, 215 N.E.2d 400 (1966).
42205 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio C.P. 1964), rev'd, 4 Ohio App. 2d 226, 212 N.X.2d 76
(1965).
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